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I. Introduction 
On July 14, 2000, Eleanor Lauff, a 75 year old, legally blind woman, went to Wal-Mart to 
purchase a birthday gift for her granddaughter.  After selecting a necklace, Ms. Lauff had to use 
the restroom.  Her son who had brought her to the store, escorted her there and waited outside for 
her.  Ms. Lauff walked to the back of the restroom to use the handicapped stall.  While walking 
to the toilet seat and sitting down, she heard toilet paper crinkle on the floor but did not notice 
any water or other liquid on the floor.  When she stood up her foot slipped out from under her 
and she fell.  While on the floor, Ms. Lauff could feel that there was water, paper, and wet gook 
all over the floor.  According to the cleaning schedule on the wall of the bathroom, no one had 
cleaned the bathroom for eight days prior to Ms. Lauff’s fall. 
Mrs. Lauff was in the hospital for nine days while doctors operated on her fractured hip 
and attempted to control her rib and chest pain.  Ms. Lauff later files suit alleging negligence on 
the part of defendant Wal-Mart for failing to keep its premises in a reasonably safe condition and 
for failing to warn her, a blind woman, about debris on the floor in the handicapped stall of the 
restroom.  Defendant brings a motion for summary judgment arguing the condition was open and 
obvious.  Consider whether the court should grant or deny the motion. 
In two recent decisions by the Michigan Supreme Court, Stitt v. Holland Abundant Life 
Fellowship, and Lugo v. Ameritech Corp., Michigan has reverted back to the historic, technical 
common-law rules that tend to immunize landowners from liability in premises liability cases.  
In doing so, Michigan has rejected the trend followed by the majority of other jurisdictions to 
instead adopt a reasonableness approach to premises liability cases due to the harshness of many 
of these common law rules.  This article will provide a brief discussion of the history of 
common-law premises liability and the current trend in the majority of jurisdictions in the United 
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States.  Then this article will provide a discussion of these Michigan decisions and their impact 
on premises liability cases in Michigan.  Finally, this paper will set forth a proposal for Michigan 
to adopt a reasonableness standard. 
II. Background 
Historically, landowners have enjoyed a position of favor among the courts.1  When the 
common-law was defining a landowner’s duty of care to visitors on his premises, the landowner 
was “the backbone of the social system” and “land ownership was synonymous with power and 
importance.”2  As a result, the law provided the landowner with many rights and privileges, and 
placed a significant emphasis on his proprietary interests.3   
In the area of premises liability, the courts adopted various rules to limit the power of a 
jury to decide premises liability cases.4  Although “aware of the threat that unlimited landowner 
freedom and its accompanying immunity placed upon the community,” courts nevertheless 
“refused to provide juries with unbounded authority to determine premises liability cases.”5  
Courts mistrusted juries because they “were comprised mainly of potential land entrants who 
most likely would act to protect the community at large and thereby reign in the landowner’s 
sovereign power over his land.”6  Thus, courts created various technical rules “to disgorge the 
jury of some of its power by either allowing the judge to take the case from the jury based on 
legal rulings or by forcing the jury to apply the mechanical rules of the trichotomy instead of 
considering the pertinent issue of whether the landowner acted reasonably in maintaining his 
                                                 
1 See Lucinda S. Ingram, Missouri Retreat From the Known or Obvious Danger Rule in Premises Liability, 54 MO. 
L. REV. 241, 243 (1989). 
2 Thomas S. Kleeh, Self v. Queen: Retaining Eighteenth Century Feudilistic Jurisprudence to determine a 
Landowner’s Duty of Care, 100 W. Va. L. Rev. 467, 470 (1997). 
3 See id. 
4 See Alexander v. Medical Associates Clinic, 646 N.W.2d 74 (Iowa, 2002). 
5 Alexander , 646 N.W.2d at 81. 
6 Id. 
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land.”7 
The most well known of these rules is the common-law trichotomy, which places a land 
entrant into one of three categories, and the category to which he is placed determines the duty of 
care the landowner owes him.8  Another of these technical rules was the “open and obvious” 
rule, which absolved the landowner from liability for harm caused by a dangerous condition on 
the land if the entrant knew and realized the risk, or the condition presented an “obvious” risk.9  
Arguably, these rules came about before negligence principles were in existence.10  When 
negligence principles emerged, they conflicted with the immunity conferred upon the landowners 
under the classifications.11  Nevertheless, many courts refused to replace these rules with modern 
principles of negligence law, but rather “superimposed the new negligence principles upon the 
existing framework of entrant categories.”12 
III. The Trichotomy 
The classification of entrants on the land is used to determine the “duty” a landowner 
owes to that particular entrant.  Liability for negligence depends upon whether a landowner owes 
a duty of care, and if so, to what extent.  Traditionally, the landowner’s duty of care toward 
persons on his property varies depending on how that injured person is classified.  These 
“classifications” or “categories” include: (1) trespassers, who entered without invitation or 
permission and were entitled to a minimal duty of care, (2) licensees who entered with 
                                                 
7 Id. 
8 See W.E. Shipley, Comment Note.--"Economic benefit" or "public invitation" as test of licensee-invitee status, 95 
A.L.R.2d 992 (1964). 
9 See Ernest H. Schopler, Modern status of the rule absolving a possessor of land of liability to those coming thereon 
for harm caused by dangerous physical conditions of which the injured party knew and realized the risk, 35 
A.L.R.3d 230 (1971). 
10 See Kleeh, supra  n. 2. 
11 See id. (citing Kathryn E. Eriksen, Premises Liability in Texas—Time for a “Reasonable” Change, 17 St. Mary’s 
L.J. 417, 421 (1986)). 
12 Id. (quoting Sears, Abrogation of the Traditional Common Law of Premises Liability, 44 U.Kan.L.Rev. at 176 
(1995)). 
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permission of the landowner and were entitled to a slightly greater degree of care than the 
trespasser, and (3) invitees, whose presence was actively desired and induced by the landowner 
and were entitled to a duty of reasonable care while they were on the premises.13 
Many jurisdictions define "invitee" broadly to include all those who enter or remain on 
land because of an invitation that carries an implied representation, understanding, or assurance 
that the landowner or occupier used reasonable care to prepare the premises and make them safe 
for these visitors.14  However, the term “invitation” is not the same as the term invitation is 
popularly understood.15  Rather, “invitee” is a term of art in the legal sense, and not everyone 
that is invited onto an owner’s land is an “invitee” in the legal sense.16  In most jurisdictions a 
social guest who enters the land upon express invitation by the owner, does not constitute an 
invitee but a licensee.17 
A. The Trichotomy under the First Restatement 
The concept of “invitation” has been subject to considerable litigation among the courts.  
The first edition of the Restatement of Torts abandoned the terms as the courts had commonly 
used them.  Instead, the Restatement of Torts offered the following definitions: 
Sec. 330.  Licensee Defined.  A licensee is a person who is privileged to enter or 
remain upon land by virtue of the possessor’s consent, whether given by 
invitation or permission.18 
Sec. 331.  Gratuitous Licensee Defined.  A gratuitous licensee is any licensee 
                                                 
13 See Shipley, supra n. 8. 
14 See 62 AM. JUR. 2D Premises Liability § 87. 
15 See id 
16 See id. 
17 See id.  Courts have declined to grant invitee status to social guests on the basis that one is not an invitee unless 
the owner or occupant has an economic interest in his visit, and also that a host merely offers his premises to a social 
guest for enjoyment with the same security that the host and his family who live on the premises would have.  Id. at 
§ 399 
18 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 330. 
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other than a business visitor as defined in Sec. 332.19 
Sec. 332.  Business Visitor Defined.  A business visitor is a person who is invited 
or permitted to enter or remain on land in the possession of another for a purpose 
directly or indirectly connected with business dealings between them.20 
 The First Restatement defines “licensee” broadly to include any person who is privileged 
to remain on the land because of the possessor’s consent, whether given by invitation or 
permission.  The First Restatement then divides this broad class into “gratuitous licensees” and 
“business visitors” thereby deliberately discarded the term “invitee” altogether.  Additionally, the 
First Restatement did away with the determination of whether the visitor entered by invitation or 
bare permission, in favor of the test that looks to the occupier’s pecuniary interest in his 
presence.21  The theory behind such a requirement is that the duty of care required of an occupier 
towards a business visitor is the price the occupier pays for the prospective economic benefit he 
hopes to derive from the person’s presence.22  Likewise, when no such benefit exists, he is under 
no such duty.23 
B. The Trichotomy under the Second Restatement. 
 The Second Restatement of Torts includes “public invitees” within the definition of 
invitee.  Section 332 defines an "invitee" as follows: 
(1) An invitee is either a public invitee or a business visitor. 
(2)  A public invitee is a person who is invited to enter or remain on land as a 
member of the public for a purpose for which the land is held open to the public. 
(3)  A business visitor is a person who is invited to enter or remain on land for a 
purpose directly or indirectly connected with business dealings with the possessor 
                                                 
19 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 331. 
20 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 332. 
21 See William L. Prosser, Business Visitors and Invitees, 26 MINN. L. REV. 573, 574 (1942). 
22 See id. 
23 See id. 
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of the land.24 
 The Second Restatment recognizes that invitees generally fall into two classes: (1) those 
that enter as members of the public for a purpose for which the land is held open to the public; 
and (2) those who enter for a purpose connected with the business of the possessor.25  Thus, the 
Second Restatement provides that an invitee is either a public invitee or a business visitor.26  
Restatement Second § 330 defines a licensee as a person who is privileged to enter or remain on 
land only by virtue of the possessor’s consent.27   
 The Second Restatement is closely aligned with the conclusions drawn by Professor 
Prosser in his critique of the First Restatement. 28  Prosser presents an historical analysis of the 
concept of “invitation” at common law in order to determine when invitee status arose.29  Prosser 
                                                 
24 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 332.  Comment (d) of section 332 of the Restatement Second states: 
     Where land is held open to the public, there is an invitation to the public to enter for the 
purpose for which it is held open.  Any member of the public who enters for that purpose is an 
invitee. 
     Where land is held open to the public, it is immaterial that the visitor does not pay for his 
admission, or that the possessor’s purpose in so opening the land is not a business purpose, and the 
visitor’s presence is in no way related to business dealings with the possessor, or to any possibility 
of benefit or advantage, present or prospective, pecuniary or otherwise, to the possessor.  Thus 
where a strip of private land abutting upon the public sidewalk is so paved that it is 
indistinquishable from the sidewalk, the possessor holds it open to the public as provided for 
public use for the purpose of passage, and anyone so using it is an invitee.  The possessor’s duty to 
use reasonable care to keep such land in proper and safe condition is not far removed from his 
obligation to the public upon the highway itself, or to those who stray a few feet from it in the 
course of travel.   
     It is not large enough, to hold land open to the public, that the public at large, or any 
considerable number of persons, are permitted to enter at will upon the land for their own 
purposes.  As in other instances of invitation, there must be some inducement or encouragement to 
enter, some conduct indicating that the premises are provided and intended for public entry and 
use and that the public will not merely be tolerated, but is expected and desired to come.  When a 
landowner tacitly permits the boys of the town to play ball on his vacant lot they are licensees 
only; but if he installs playground equipment and posts a sign saying that the lot is open free to all 
children, there is then a public invitation, and those who enter in response to it are invitees.  Id. 
25 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 332. 
26 See id. 
27 See id. 
28 William L. Prosser, Business Visitors and Invitees, 26 MINN. L. REV. 573 (1942).  Interestingly, the leading 
proponent of the economic benefit rule among the legal writers was Professor Bohlen, who was also the reporter for 
the first edition of the Restatement of Torts.  95 A.L.R. 992, n.5. 
29 William L. Prosser, Business Visitors and Invitees, 26 MINN. L. REV. 573 (1942). 
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found that “benefit” to the occupier did not play an important part in determining invitee status, 
and in most of the early decisions, it was entirely absent.30  Rather, “the theory of liability is 
simply that the defendant has opened his premises to the public with an invitation to come, and 
that the plaintiff has come as one of the public, in reliance upon an implied representation of 
safety.”31 
Prosser determined that the origin of the notion that benefit to the occupier as the sine 
qua non of an affirmative duty of care to make the premises safe, originated with Robert 
Campbell in his treatise on negligence in 1871.32  According to Professor Prosser, one thing that 
is clear from the early cases that determine invitee status “is that the duty of the occupier toward 
his ‘invitee’ was not, in its inception, a matter of quid pro quo for a benefit conferred or hoped 
for.”33  Rather, it rested “upon an implied representation of safety, a holding out of the premises 
as suitable for the purpose for which the visitor came; and this was stated in terms of an 
invitation to come.”34 
Where the “mutual benefit” or “business visitor” came into play were in situations 
involving private invitations.35  Courts relied upon the business purpose or mutual benefit 
requirement to impose a greater duty on private property owners than was required toward their 
                                                 
30 See id. 
31 Id. 
32 See id. citing Campbell, Law of Negligence (2d ed. 1878) 63-64.  “The principle appears to be that invitatio is 
inferred where there is a common interest or mutual advantage, while a license is inferred where the object is the 
mere pleasure or benefit of the person using it.”  Id. 
33 William L. Prosser, Business Visitors and Invitees, 26 MINN. L. REV. 573 (1942).  Interestingly, the leading 
proponent of the economic benefit rule among the legal writers was Professor Bohlen, who was also the reporter for 
the first edition of the Restatement of Torts. 
34 Id. 
35Id..  “A private invitation or permission to enter is one which is extended to the individual only, and is not shared 
by the public at large.  It follows that the individual cannot rest his claim upon any representation made or any duty 
owed to him as one of the public, but must look to his personal relation with the occupier as the source of the 
obligation to protect him.”  Id. 
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social guests.36  By looking at the purpose for the invitation by the owner, courts could 
distinguish between those who were invited for some “mutual benefit” or “business purpose” of 
the possessor, and those who were merely social guests of the possessor.37 
The Second Restatement of Torts demonstrates the move away from the traditional 
immunity afforded to landowners.  Under the Second Restatement, a landowner who holds the 
land open to the public for some public purpose has the same duty of care as a business owner.  
The invitation test under the Second Restatement goes further and deems the visitor an invitee if 
the visitor enters the premises for that particular purpose for which the premises is held open to 
the public for.38 
C. Toward a Standard of Reasonableness 
Since 1957, many jurisdictions rejected the common-law category distinctions in favor of 
a test that these courts viewed as more suitable to the modern state of negligence law.  England, 
the jurisdiction that created the entrant classifications, was the first to reject them.  When 
England passed the Occupier’s Liability Act in 1957 it abolished the distinction between invitees 
and licensees, and instead imposed a “common duty of care” toward all persons who enter the 
premises upon the occupier of land 39   
Two years later, in Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique,40 the United 
States Supreme Court refused to extend the common-law distinctions between licensees and 
invitees to maritime law.  The Supreme Court recognized that the classifications were created in 
a culture “deeply rooted to the land, a culture which traced many of its standards to a heritage of 
                                                 
36 See id. 
37 See id. 
38 See 62 AM. JUR. 2D Premises Liability § 92. 
39See Occupier’s Liability Act, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 31 (1957). 
40 358 U.S. 625 (1959). 
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feudalism.”41  The Court noted that courts have formulated “subtle refinements,” sub 
classifications among common-law categories, and delineated “fine gradations in the standards 
of care” in order to achieve justice “in an industrialized urban society, with its complex 
economic and individual relationships.”42  However, these classifications and sub classifications 
have produced confusion and conflict and new distinctions have obscured the older ones.43  From 
this, the Court reasoned, the common-law has moved toward imposing a duty of reasonable care 
to persons under the circumstances.44   
 In 1968, California was the first United States jurisdiction to judicially abrogate the 
common-law categories when the Supreme Court of California issued its opinion in Rowland v. 
Christian.45  The court set forth its rationale for abolishing the common-law categories: 
A man’s life or limb does not become less worthy of protection by the law nor a 
loss less worthy of compensation under the law because he has come upon the 
land of another without permission or with permission but without a business 
purpose.  Reasonable people do not ordinarily vary their conduct depending upon 
such matters, and to focus upon the status of the injured party as a trespasser, 
licensee, or invitee in order to determine the question whether the landowner has a 
duty of care, is contrary to our modern social mores and humanitarian values.  
The common law rules obscure rather than illuminate the proper considerations 
which should govern determination of the question of duty.46 
Rowland listed a number of factors to be considered in determining whether to allow an 
exception to the general principle that a person is liable for injury caused by the failure to 
exercise reasonable care: 
[T]he foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the 
plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant's 
conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant's 
conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the 
                                                 
41 Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 630-31 (1959). 
42 Kermarec, 358 U.S. at 630-31. 
43 See id. 
44 See id. at 632. 
45 443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968). 
46 Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 568 (Cal. 1968). 
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defendant and consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care 
with resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and prevalence of 
insurance for the risk involved.47 
The California Supreme Court’s decision in Rowland has motivated a number of other 
jurisdictions to reevaluate the usefulness and viability of maintaining the common-law 
trichotomy.48  Today, fifteen states have rejected the invitee-licensee distinction in favor of a 
reasonableness standard,49 while eight states have abolished all three common-law categories in 
favor of a reasonableness standard.50  Twenty-seven jurisdictions still recognize the common-law 
categories of trespasser, invitee, licensee.51  However, the majority of the jurisdictions that have 
retained the common-law categories have adopted the Second Restatement’s definition of 
                                                 
47 Rowland, 443 P.2d at 568. 
48 See  Kotzebue v. McLean, 702 P.2d 1309, 1314 (Alaska 1985); Evans v. Park, 732 P.2d 369, 370 (Idaho Ct. App. 
1987); Moody v. Manny's Auto Repair, 871 P.2d 935, 943 (Nev. 1994); Ford v. Board of County Comm'rs, 879 P.2d 
766, 770 (1994); Nelson v. Freeland, 507 S.E.2d 882, 886 (N.C. 1998); Mallet v. Pickens, 522 S.E.2d 436, 444 
(1999). 
49 See Calvillo-Silva v. Home Grocery, 968 P.2d 65, 72 (Cal. 1998); Sheets v. Ritt, Ritt & Ritt, Inc., 581 N.W.2d 
602, 606 (Iowa 1998); Jones v. Hansen, 867 P.2d 303, 310 (Kan. 1994); Poulin v. Colby College, 402 A.2d 846, 850 
(Me. 1979); Mounsey v. Ellard, 297 N.E.2d 43 (Mass. 1973); Louis v. Louis, 636 N.W.2d 314 (Minn. 2001); Heins 
v. Webster County, 552 N.W.2d 51, 57 (Neb. 1996); Ford v. Board of County Com'rs of County of Dona Ana, 879 
P.2d 766, 771 (N.M. 1994); Nelson v. Freeland, 507 S.E.2d 882, 893 (1998), O'Leary v. Coenen, 251 N.W.2d 746, 
751-52 (N.D. 1977); Tantimonico v. Allendale Mut. Ins. Co., 637 A.2d 1056, (R.I. 1994); Hudson v. Gaitan, 675 
S.W.2d 699 (Tenn.1984); Mallet v. Pickens, 522 S.E.2d 436, 448 (W.Va. 1999); Antoniewicz v. Reszcynski, 236 
N.W.2d 1, 11 (Wis. 1975); Clarke v. Beckwith, 858 P.2d 293, 296 (Wyo. 1993). 
50 See Webb v. City & Borough of Sitka, 561 P.2d 731 (Alaska 1977); Pickard v. City and County of Honolulu, 452 
P.2d 445, 446 (Haw. 1969); Perry v. Williamson, 824 S.W.2d 869, 875 (Ky. 1992); Cates v. Beauregard Elec. Co-
op., Inc., 3s28 So.2d 367, 371 (La. 1976); Limberhand v. Big Ditch Co., 706 P.2d 491, 496 (Mont. 1985); Moody v. 
Manny's Auto Repair, 871 P.2d 935, 942-43 (Nev. 1994); Ouellette v. Blanchard, 364 A.2d 631, 634 (N.H. 1976); 
Basso v. Miller, 352 N.E.2d 868, 872 (N.Y. 1976). 
51See Nicoletti v. Westcor, Inc., 639 P.2d 330, 332-33 (Ariz. 1982); Tucker v. Sullivan, 307 Ark. 440, 821 S.W.2d 
440 (1991); Corcoran v. Jacovino, 290 A.2d 225, 228 (Conn. 1971); Colorado, C.R.S. 13-21-115(5)(c) (1999); 
Malin v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 438 A.2d 1221, 1226 (Del.Supr. 1981); Post v. Lunney, 261 So.2d 146, 148-49 
(Fla. 1972); Loomis v. Granny's Rocker Nite Club, 620 N.E.2d 664, (Ill.App. 1993); Burrell v. Meads, 569 N.E.2d 
637, 642 (Ind. 1991); Howard County Bd. of Educ. v. Cheyne, 99 Md. App. 150; Martin v. B.P. Exploration & Oil, 
Inc., 769 So.2d 261, 265 (Miss.App. 2000); Martin v. City of Washington, 848 S.W.2d 487, 493, (Mo. 1993); Daily 
v. K-Mart Corp. 458 N.E.2d 471(1981), Walsh v. C & K Market, Inc., 16 P.3d 1179, 1181 (Or. 2000); Palange v. 
City of Philadelphia, Law Dept., 640 A.2d 1305, 1308 (Pa. 1994); Sims v. Giles, 541 S.E.2d 857, 862 (S.C.App. 
2001); City of Richmond v. Grizzard, 136 S.E.2d 827, 830 (1964); McKinnon v. Washington Fed. Sav. & Loan 
Ass'n, 414 P.2d 773 (1966); OCGA § 51-3-1; Peterson v. Romine, 960 P.2d 1266, 1269 (Idaho 1998); Filipowicz v. 
Diletto, 796 A.2d 296, 300 (N.J.Super. 2002); Brown v. Nicholson, 935 P.2d  319, 321-322 (Okla. 1997); Underberg 
v. Cain, 348 N.W.2d 145, 146 (S.D.1984), Wool v. Larner, 26 A.2d 89, 92-93 (Vt. 1942);   
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invitee.52 
D. The Trichotomy in Michigan:  Stitt v. Holland Abundant Life Fellowship 
In Stitt v. Holland Abundant Life Fellowship,53 the Michigan Supreme Court narrowed 
the definition of an “invitee” which applies in premises liability cases.  In Stitt, Plaintiff Violet 
Moeller had joined a friend to participate in an evening bible study at defendant’s church.54  
While Ms. Moeller was exiting her friend’s vehicle, she tripped over a tire stop in the parking lot 
of defendant’s church and fractured her left arm.55  Subsequently, Ms. Moeller brought a 
premises liability claim against the defendant church, alleging that the church negligently placed 
the tire stop and failed to provide adequate lighting in the parking lot.56 
The Michigan Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine the narrow issue of whether 
invitee status should extend to individuals entering upon church property for noncommercial 
purposes.57   In a 5-2 decision, the Michigan Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and 
held that persons on the premises of a church for other than commercial purposes are licensees 
and not invitees.58   
The Court recognized the three common-law categories for persons who enter upon the 
                                                 
52See Nicoletti v. Westcor, Inc., 639 P.2d 330, 332-33 (Ariz. 1982); Tucker v. Sullivan, 307 Ark. 440, 821 S.W.2d 
470 (1991); Corcoran v. Jacovino, 290 A.2d 225, 228 (Conn. 1971); Colorado, C.R.S. 13-21-115(5)(c) (1999); 
Malin v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 438 A.2d 1221, 1226 (Del.Supr. 1981); Post v. Lunney, 261 So.2d 146, 148-49 
(Fla. 1972); Loomis v. Granny's Rocker Nite Club, 620 N.E.2d 664, (Ill.App. 1993); Burrell v. Meads, 569 N.E.2d 
637, 642 (Ind. 1991); Howard County Bd. of Educ. v. Cheyne, 99 Md. App. 150; Martin v. B.P. Exploration & Oil, 
Inc., 769 So.2d 261, 265 (Miss.App. 2000); Martin v. City of Washington, 848 S.W.2d 487, 493, (Mo. 1993); Daily 
v. K-Mart Corp. 458 N.E.2d 471(1981), Walsh v. C & K Market, Inc., 16 P.3d 1179, 1181 (Or. 2000); Palange v. 
City of Philadelphia, Law Dept., 640 A.2d 1305, 1308 (Pa. 1994); Sims v. Giles, 541 S.E.2d 857, 862 (S.C.App. 
2001); City of Richmond v. Grizzard, 136 S.E.2d 827, 830 (1964); McKinnon v. Washington Fed. Sav. & Loan 
Ass'n, 414 P.2d 773 (1966). 
53 462 Mich. 591, 614 N.W.2d 88, (2000). 
54See Stitt v. Holland Abundant Life Fellowship,  462 Mich. 591, 594, 614 N.W.2d 88, 90 (2000). 
55 See Stitt, 462 Mich.at 594, 614 N.W.2d at 90. 
56 See id. 
57 See Stitt 462 Mich. at 597. 
58 See id. at 607 
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premises of another: (1) trespasser, (2) licensee, or (3) invitee.59  A “trespasser” is “a person who 
enters upon another’s land, without the landowner’s consent.”60  The only duty a landowner 
owes to a trespasser is to refrain from injuring the trespasser by “willful and wanton” 
misconduct.61  A “‘licensee’ is a person who is privileged to enter the land of another by virtue 
of the possessor’s consent.”62   A landowner has a duty to warn licensees of any hidden dangers 
the owner knows or has reason to know of, if the licensee does not know or have reason to know 
of the dangers involved.63  Importantly, the landowner does not have a duty to inspect or to use 
affirmative care to make the premises safe for the licensee’s visit.64 
An “invitee” is “a person who enters upon the land of another upon invitation which 
carries with it an implied representation, assurance, or understanding that reasonable care has 
been used to prepare the premises, and make it safe for the invitee’s reception.”65  As to 
“invitees”, the landowner has a duty to invitees in addition to the duty to warn the invitee of any 
dangers known to the landowner, the obligation to “make the premises safe, which requires the 
landowner to inspect the premises and, depending upon the circumstances, make any necessary 
repairs or warn of any discovered hazards.”66  A landowner is liable to invitees who are injured 
by a condition on the land if the landowner: (a) knows of, or by the exercise of reasonable care 
would discover, the condition and should realize that it poses an unreasonable risk of harm to 
invitees; (b) should expect that invitees will not discover the danger, or will not be able to protect 
themselves from the danger; and (c) does not exercise reasonable care to protect invitees from 
                                                 
59 Id. at 596. 
60 Id. 
61 See id. 
62 Id. 
63 See id. 
64 See id. at 596-97. 
65 Id. at 597. 
66 Id. 
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the danger.67 
After setting forth these basic principles, the Court looked to Michigan’s common-law to 
determine the meaning of “invitation.”  Noting that previous decisions were unclear as to what 
extent an invitation is sufficient to confer the status of “invitee,” the Court nevertheless found 
support for “the requirement that the landowner’s premises be held open for a commercial 
business purpose.”68  Likewise, the Court recognized that “some of its earlier decisions were 
“replete with broad language suggestive of the Restatement’s ‘public invitee’ definition,” 
however the Court emphasized that in these cases “the precise contours of the definition, are 
difficult to discern.”69   
Finally, the Court looked to Preston, which the court of appeals had interpreted as having 
adopted the second Restatement of Torts, section 332.70  The majority disagreed with the court of 
appeals, stating that even though Preston is purported to have adopted the Restatement “public 
invitee” definition, it also appears to recognize the commercial purpose requirement.71  The 
Court found that Preston recognized the commercial purpose requirement when, quoting Cooley 
on Torts, it stated: 
An invitation may be inferred when there is a common interest or mutual 
advantage, a license when the object is the mere pleasure or benefit of the person 
using it.  “To come under an implied invitation, as distinguished from a mere 
license, the visitor must come for a purpose connected with the business with 
                                                 
67 See id.  
68 Id. at 598 citing Perl v. Cohodas, Peterson, Paoli, Nast Co., 295 Mich. 325, 294 N.W. 697 (1940); Diefenbach v. 
Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 280 Mich. 507, 273, N.W. 783 (1937); Sink v. Grand Trunk Western R. Co., 227 
Mich. 21, 198 N.W. 238 (1924); Butler v. Ramco-Gerchenson, Inc., 214 Mich.App. 521, 542 N.W.2d 912 (1995); 
Bradford v. Feeback, 149 Mich. App. 67, 385 N.W.2d 729 (1986); Leep v. McComber, 118 Mich.App. 653, 325 
N.W.2d 531 (1982).  The Court also found it significant that “the ‘commercial purpose’ distinction is sufficiently 
recognized in Michigan case law that there are even secondary authorities that include Michigan among those 
jurisdictions conferring invitee status only on business visitors.  Id. 
69 Id. at 599 citing Polston v. S.S. Kresge Co., 324 Mich. 575, 37 N.W.2d 638 (1949); Sheldon v. Flint & P.M. R. 
Co., 59 Mich. 172, 26 N.W. 507 (1886); Hargreaves v. Deacon, 25 Mich. 1 (1872). 
70See id. citing Preston v. Sleziak,  383 Mich. 442, 175 N.W.2d 759 (1970). 
71 See id. 
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which the occupant of the premises is engaged, or which he permits to be carried 
on there.  There must be some mutuality of interest in the subject to which the 
visitor’s business relates, although the particular business which is the object of 
the visit may not be for the benefit of the occupant.  The distinction between a 
visitor who is a mere licensee and one who is on the premises by invitation turns 
largely on the nature of the business that brings him there, rather than on the 
words or acts of the owner which precede his coming.”72 
 The Court emphasized Cooley’s acknowledgement that invitee status depends upon a 
“commercial purpose” and “mutuality of interest” concerning the visit, and determined that this 
language demonstrates “that Michigan has historically, if not uniformly, recognized a 
commercial business purpose as a precondition for establishing invitee status.”73  The Court 
justified its refusal to recognize the public invitee status as follows: 
The imposition of additional expense and effort by the landowner, requiring the 
landowner to inspect the premises and make them safe for visitors, must be 
directly tied to the owner’s commercial business interests.  It is the owner’s desire 
to foster a commercial advantage by inviting persons to visit the premises that 
justifies imposition of a higher duty.  In short, we conclude that the prospect of 
pecuniary gain is a sort of quid pro quo for the higher duty of care owed to 
invitees.  Thus, we hold that the owner’s reason for inviting persons onto the 
premises is the primary consideration when determining the visitor’s status:  In 
order to establish invitee status, a plaintiff must show that the premises were held 
open for a commercial purpose.74   
 Turning to the case before it, the Court adopted the rationale of a 1957 Florida Supreme 
Court decision, McNulty v. Hurley,75 which considered a business purpose or a business or 
commercial benefit to the landowner is a necessary requirement for a visitor to have invitee 
                                                 
72 Id. quoting 3 Cooley, Torts (4th ed.), § 440, pp. 193-194 (emphasis added). 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
75 97 So.2d 185 (Fla. 1957).  The majority found the following language in McNulty persuasive: 
An invitation to enter and worship, whether it be either express or implied, does not constitute one 
who accepts the invitation an invitee in the legal sense.  In order for such relationship to arise the 
person entering onto the premises, i.e., the invitee must have done so for purposes which would 
have benefited the owenr or occupant of the premises, i.e., the invitor, or have been of mutual 
benefit to the invitee and the invitor.  And as we view it this benefit must be of a material or 
commercial rather than of a spiritual, religious, or social nature.  Stitt, 462 Mich. at 605 (quoting 
McNulty,  97 So.2d at 188). 
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status.76  The Stitt majority agreed with McNulty’s rejection of the argument that she had made 
financial contributions in the past.  The court adopted the following language from McNulty: 
[N]or would it matter if the plaintiff had alleged that she made a contribution 
when the collection plate was passed, for this would not have changed her 
status….  It seems clear to us…that one who attends a religious edifice for the 
purpose of attending a religious service, as did the plaintiff in this case, does so 
“for his own convenience, pleasure or benefit” and is at best a licensee.77 
 The Court recognized that a majority of jurisdictions have adopted the public invitee 
definition as set forth in section 332 of the Restatement.78  Nevertheless, the Court declined to do 
so under the auspice of its role in “determin[ing] which common law rules best serve the 
interests of Michigan citizens.”79  The Michigan Supreme Court concluded, “Michigan is better 
served by recognizing that invitee status must be founded on a commercial purpose for visiting 
the owner’s premises.”80  Therefore, “[a]bsent a showing that the church’s invitation to attend its 
services was for an essential commercial purpose, Ms. Moeller should be considered a licensee, 
and not an invitee.”81 
 In her dissent, Justice Kelly identifies the flaws in the majority’s reasoning and purports 
instead that Michigan case law supports the adoption of the “public invitee” as set forth in the 
                                                 
76 See Stitt, 462 Mich. at 605.  As noted by Justice Kelly, Florida rejected the McNulty decision in Post v. Lunney, 
261 So.2d 146.  In Post, the Florida Supreme Court adopted § 332, pointing out that the McNulty mutual benefit test 
was too narrow and had the potential to cause unjust results.  See id. at 617-18 (Kelly, J. dissenting).   
“For example, it would prohibit recovery for damages due to ordinary negligence to a “window 
shopping” visitor to a store, while permitting recovery to a person who made a purchase however 
small.  To avoid these and similar results, the economic benefit theory has been strained to the 
breaking point.  The Florida court applied the public invitee provision of § 332 to the case.  It 
concluded that the plaintiff was an invitee because she had been invited to enter the property 
opened to members of the public for tours.”  Id. (Kelly, J. dissenting) (quoting Post v. Lunney, 261 
So.2d 146 (Fla. 1972). 
77 Id. at 606 (quoting McNulty, 97 So.2d at 188-189). 
78 See id. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. 
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Restatement Second Section 332.82   Justice Kelly also points out that most of the decisions that 
rely on the “business invitee” provision of § 332 do not consider the “public invitee” provision 
because they could establish invitee status on the basis of economic benefit to the owner.83 
Justice Kelly notes that the Florida Supreme Court has overruled the decision relied upon 
by the majority, McNulty v. Hurley.84  In Post v. Lunney,85 the Florida Supreme Court adopted § 
332 including the public invitee provision.  In court in Post found the mutual benefit test was too 
narrow and had the potential to cause unjust results: “it would prohibit recovery for damages due 
to ordinary negligence to a ‘window-shopping’ visitor to a store, while permitting recovery to a 
person who made a purchase, however small.86  To avoid these and similar results “the economic 
benefit theory has been strained to the breaking point.”87 
Justice Kelly adopted the reasoning of the Indiana Court of Appeals in Fleischer v. 
Hebrew Orthodox Congregation for adopting the “public invitee” test of the Restatement 
                                                 
82 See id. at 608 (J. Kelly dissenting). 
83 See id. at 614-15 (J. Kelly dissenting) (citing Stanley v. Town Square Cooperative, 203 Mich.App. 143, 147, 512 
N.W.2d 51 (1993) (“The distinguishing characteristic that fixes the duty depends upon whether the licensee’s visit is 
related to the pecuniary interests of the possessor of the land”) (the guest of a co-op resident was an invitee because 
the co-op obtained pecuniary gain in exchane for giving the resident the right to license visitors); White v. 
Badalamenti, 200 Mich.App. 434, 436, 505 N.W.2d 8 (1993) (“To be an invitee, plaintiff’s presence on defendants’ 
land must have been related to an activity of some tangible benefit to defendants”) (the question for the jury to 
decide is whether an unpaid babysitter who was injured at defendant’s home is an invitee); Doran v. Combs, 135 
Mich.App. 492, 496, 354 N.W.2d 804 (1984) (“An invitee is one who is on the owner’s premises for a purpose 
mutually beneficial to both parties”) (a former mother-in-law who fell on the defendant’s driveway while returning 
children from the former husband’s home was an invitee because of the pecuniary benefit received by the 
defendant); Danaher v. Partridge Creek Country Club, 116 Mich.App. 305, 312, 323 N.W.2d 376 (1982) (“[A]n 
invitee is one who is on the owner’s premises for a purpose mutually beneficial to both parties”) (the plaintiff was an 
invitee when he arrived at the defendant’s golf course to play golf); Socha v. Passino, 195 Mich.App. 445, 447-48, 
206 N.W.2d 316 (1981) (“An individual can be an invitee if the visit may reasonably be said to confer or anticipate a 
business, commercial, monetary, or other tangible benefit to the occupant”) (the plaintiff was a licensee when in 
jured in the defendant’s house while removing a piece of furniture that benefited him, but provided no benefit to the 
defendant). 
84 97 So.2d 185. 
85 261 So.2d 146 (1972). 
86 Id. 
87 Id. 
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Second. 88  The Indiana Court of Appeals noted that the “public invitee” test of § 332 would not 
extend invitee status to social guests because it requires the owner or occupant to hold his 
premises open to the public.89  Because the occupier holds the premises out to the public, the 
condition and use of the premises affects the public interest, thus it is reasonable to impose a 
standard of reasonable care toward members of the public who enter for the purpose for which 
they are invited.90  The occupant can withdraw the invitation or restrict entry and thereby retain 
control of his property.91  Furthermore, the test requires the visitor “enter the premises for the 
particular purpose for which the occupant has encouraged the public to do so.”92  “Given the 
public interest involved and our recognition of the implication of safety which arises when the 
public is encouraged to enter premises for a particular purpose” therefore, the public invitee test 
is a proper guide for determining invitee status.93 
E. So, Who’s Right? 
Jurisdictions that have refused to abolish the common-law categories present a variety of 
rationales.  One rationale is that a “duty of reasonable care under the circumstances”, despite its 
common usage, is an amorphous standard that provides little guidance to the landowner.94  
Furthermore, just to say that the rule is reasonable care under the circumstances in all instances 
ignores the responsibility of the law to provide guidance.95  “To abandon the careful work of 
generations for an amorphous ‘reasonable care under the circumstances’ standard seems [rather] 
                                                 
88 462 Mich. at 619 (Kelly, J. dissenting) (quoting Fleischer v. Hebrew Orthodox Congregation, 504 N.E.2d 320, 
323 (Ind.App., 1987). 
89 See id. 
90 See id. 
91 See id. 
92 See id. 
93 See id. 
94 See Wood v. Camp, 284 So.2d 691 (Fla.1973). 
95See id. 
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improvident.”96  One court contrasts the common law rule, described as “well-settled and 
reasonable,” with the negligence standard, “a single vague duty of reasonable care, under which 
the property owner acts at his peril with no standard by which he can judge his obligations in 
advance.”97  Moreover, they argue that a reasonableness standard imposes upon the landowner 
the expense of “emotional and monetary resources to defend a meritless suit” where a judge or 
jury may find no liability.98 
The main reason that the categories were created was because of the general mistrust of 
juries in entering a just verdict.99  As one court observed, “jurisdictions retaining the trichotomy 
fear that plaintiff-oriented juries—like feudal juries composed mostly of land entrants—will 
impose unreasonable burdens upon defendant-landowners.”100  However, juries have properly 
applied negligence principles in all other areas of tort law, and there has been no indication that 
defendants in other areas have had unreasonable burdens placed upon them.101  Modern jurors 
are more likely to be landowners themselves, thus it is unlikely that they would be willing to 
place a burden upon a defendant that they would not wish to comply with themselves.102  
Furthermore, “[s]tudies suggest that abolition of the distinctions between the duty owed to an 
invitee and that owed to a licensee has not altered greatly the results reached, has not left the 
juries without direction or standards by which to judge the action of the occupier of lands, and 
has resulted in outcomes that would probably be the same as if the status rules had been 
applied.”103  In response to the argument by critics who say abolishing the licensee-invitee 
                                                 
96See Carter v. Kinney, 896 S.W.2d 926, 930 (Mo.1995). 
97See Tantimonico v. Allendale Mut. Ins. Co., 637 A.2d 1056 (R.I.1994).  
98 See Wood, 284 So.2d at 694. 
99 See Alexander, 646 N.W.2d at 82 
100 Id. citing Nelson v. Freeland, 507 S.E.2d 882, 892 (N.C.1998).. 
101 See id. 
102 See id. 
103 See id. citing Jones v. Hansen, 867 P.2d  303 (1998). 
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distinction will leave the jury without any standards, the Massachusetts Supreme Court 
answered: 
The abolition of the licensee-invitee distinction and the creation of a “reasonable 
care in all the circumstances” standard will not leave the jury without standards to 
guide their determination of reasonable conduct.  The principles which are now to 
be applied are those which have always governed personal negligence.  Our 
decision merely prevents the plaintiff’s status as a licensee or invitee from being 
the sole determinative factor in assessing the occupier’s liability.  However, the 
foreseeability of the visitor’s presence and the time, manner, place and 
surrounding circumstances of his entry remain relevant factors which will 
determine “in part the likelihood of injury to him, and the extent of the interest 
which must be sacrificed to avoid the risk of injury.104 
The trichotomy has led to confusion in the law, and inequity in the cases decided.105  
Recovery by an entrant in many instances “has become dependent upon the pigeonhole in which 
the law has put him, e.g. ‘trespasser,’ ‘licensee,’ or ‘invitee’ – each of which has had radically 
different consequences in law.”106  Consider the following: 
A canvasser who comes on your premises without your consent is a trespasser.  
Once he has your consent, he is a licensee.  Not until you do business with him is 
he an invitee.  Even when you have done business with him, it seems rather 
strange that your duty towards him should be different when he comes up to your 
door from what it was when he goes away.  Does he change his color in the 
middle of the conversation?  What is the position when you discuss business with 
him and it comes to nothing?  No confident answer can be given to these 
questions.  Such is the morass into which the law has floundered in trying to 
distinguish between licensees and invitees.107 
 Courts recognize that “[i]t is often difficult, if not impossible, to discern an entrant’s 
status.”108  Arguably, the focus should not be on the plaintiff’s status as licensee or invitee but 
                                                 
104 Mounsey v. Ellard, 297 N.E.2d 43, 51 n.7 (Mass.1973). 
105 See Alexander, 646 N.W.2d at 82. 
106 Peterson v. Balach, 294 Minn. 161, 199 N.W.2d 639, 642 (1972). 
107 Mallet v. Pickens, 522 S.E.2d 436, 441 (W.Va. 1999) (citations omitted). 
108 Vega v. Piedilato, 154 N.J. 496, 713 A.2d 442, 450 (N.J.1998) (Handler, J., concurring).  Mallet cites the 
following examples from other jurisdictions underscoring the tortured logic courts have gone through in applying 
the trichotomy: Franconia Assoc. v. Clark, 250 Va. 444, 463 S.E.2d 670 (Va.1995) (considering whether mall 
employee lost status as an invitee by attempting to stop a robber); Lakeview Assoc. Ltd. v. Maes, 907 P.2d 580 
(Colo.1995) (discussing whether tenant, who paid rent but happened to not own a car, was invitee or licensee when 
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whether the landowner exercised reasonable care under the circumstances to ensure that the 
premises were safe for a reasonably foreseeable event, namely, that someone might suffer injury 
under the circumstances.109  
Most of the jurisdictions have only abolished the distinction between licensees and 
invitees, and have retained the trespasser distinction.110  One court in refusing to abrogate the 
trespasser distinction held that “balanced against the need for a predictable standard by which 
landowners may govern their conduct is the absence of any right of a trespasser to claim more 
generous protections since the trespasser comes on the land without the express or implied 
consent or invitation of the property owner.”111  Another commentator notes, “[I]n a civilization 
based on private ownership, it is considered a socially desirable policy to allow a person to use 
his own land in his own way, without the burden of watching for and protecting those who come 
there without permission or right.”112  One court adopted the following rationale for retaining the 
trespasser distinction:  
[I]nvitees and licensees enter another’s lands under color of right, [but] a 
trespasser has no basis for claiming extended protection.  There remains the 
possibility that the abandonment of the status of trespasser would place an unfair 
                                                                                                                                                             
she fell while walking across the parking lot of an apartment complex); Peterson v. Romine, 131 Idaho 537, 960 
P.2d 1266 (Idaho 1998) (considering whether plaintiff who parked in downtown parking lot provided for shoppers, 
but who shopped at an adjacent but unaffiliated store, was therefore not a business invitee when she was injured by 
stepping into a pothole); and Gladon v. Greater Cleveland Reg'l Transit Auth., 75 Ohio St.3d 312, 662 N.E.2d 287 
(Ohio 1996) (questioning whether fare-paying customer of subway system, who was assaulted and thrown onto 
tracks by third parties upon exiting train, was still invitee when left lying on tracks and struck by train). Mallet, 522 
S.E.2d at 447 n. 7. 
109 See Alexander, 646 N.W.2d at 83. 
110 See Calvillo-Silva v. Home Grocery, 968 P.2d 65, 72 (Cal. 1998); Sheets v. Ritt, Ritt & Ritt, Inc., 581 N.W.2d 
602, 606 (Iowa 1998); Jones v. Hansen, 867 P.2d 303, 310 (Kan. 1994); Poulin v. Colby College, 402 A.2d 846, 850 
(Me. 1979); Mounsey v. Ellard, 297 N.E.2d 43 (Mass. 1973); Louis v. Louis, 636 N.W.2d 314 (Minn. 2001); Heins 
v. Webster County, 552 N.W.2d 51, 57 (Neb. 1996); Ford v. Board of County Com'rs of County of Dona Ana, 879 
P.2d 766, 771 (N.M. 1994); Nelson v. Freeland, 507 S.E.2d 882, 893 (1998), O'Leary v. Coenen, 251 N.W.2d 746, 
751-52 (N.D. 1977); Tantimonico v. Allendale Mut. Ins. Co., 637 A.2d 1056, (R.I. 1994); Hudson v. Gaitan, 675 
S.W.2d 699 (Tenn.1984); Mallet v. Pickens, 522 S.E.2d 436, 448 (W.Va. 1999); Antoniewicz v. Reszcynski, 236 
N.W.2d 1, 11 (Wis. 1975); Clarke v. Beckwith, 858 P.2d 293, 296 (Wyo. 1993). 
111 Poulin v. Colby College, 402 A.2d 846, 851 n. 5 (Me.1979). 
112 W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 58, at 395 (5th ed.1984). 
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burden on a landowner who has no reason to expect a trespasser’s presence.113 
In fact, the California legislature enacted a law that limited a landowners’ liability to trespassers 
who were on the property to commit a crime in response to cases in which trespassing criminals 
had recovered for injuries sustained while engaging in an unlawful intrusions.114  
Although some jurisdictions require some sort of material or economic benefit to the 
landowner to confer invitee status,115 no jurisdictions require that the premises be held open for a 
“commercial purpose” in order to justify the higher standard of care.  Thus, charities, 
government buildings, non-profit organizations, individual homeowners, and the like will no 
longer be held to the higher duty imposed in the invitor-invitee context because it is rare that 
their premises are held open for a “commercial purpose”.  Arguably, the economic benefit rule 
does not even apply because even if the entrant is on the premises and is providing some sort of 
pecuniary benefit to the landowner, as long as the premises is not held open for a “commercial 
purpose,” the entrant is entitled only to licensee status.  Thus, the landowner will only owe them 
a duty to warn of hidden latent defects of which he is aware, and the duty to avoid willful and 
wanton misconduct. 
 The argument in favor of abolishing the categories finds its strength in the notion that 
juries have proven capable of determining whether the possessor’s conduct is reasonable under 
everyday circumstances.116  Those who advocate a less structured standard are likely to stress 
that property ownership is a privilege as well as a right, and imposes high obligations as well as 
                                                 
113 Poulin v. Colby College, A.2d 846, 851 (Me.1979). 
114 See Alexander, 646 N.W.2d at 77, citing 1085 Cal. Stat. Ch. 1541, § 1 (codified at Cal. Civil Code § 847 (West 
2002)). 
115See OCGA § 51-3-1; Peterson v. Romine, 960 P.2d 1266, 1269 (Idaho 1998); Filipowicz v. Diletto, 796 A.2d 
296, 300 (N.J.Super. 2002); Brown v. Nicholson, 935 P.2d  319, 321-322 (Okla. 1997); Underberg v. Cain, 348 
N.W.2d 145, 146 (S.D.1984), Wool v. Larner, 26 A.2d 89, 92-93 (Vt. 1942); Hambright v. First Baptist Church, 638 
So.2d 865, 867 (Ala. 1994); Stevens v. Salt Lake County, 478 P.2d 496, 498-99 (Utah 1970); Olivier v. Snowden, 
426 S.W.2d 545, 550 (Tex.1968). 
116 Marshall S. Shapo, Basic Principles of Tort Law, 77. 
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offering substantial benefits.117 
 The rule adopted by the Court in Stitt is harsh, inequitable, and not supported by any 
other jurisdiction.  The “commercial purpose” requirement serves to remove a substantial portion 
of landowners from liability from dangerous conditions on their property.  At first blush, this rule 
could appear to wipe out a great deal of premises liability claims in Michigan.  However, there 
have been relatively few decisions that have turned on Stitt, primarily because the Michigan 
Supreme Court has redefined another common-law technical rule, which has had a much greater 
impact on premises liability decisions in Michigan. 
IV. The Open and Obvious Danger Doctrine 
 The “open and obvious” danger rule is also firmly entrenched in the common law.118  
Traditionally, a landowner does not owe an invitee a duty to warn or a duty to protect against 
dangers that are open and obvious to the invitee.119  This limitation on the landowners duty is 
another example of how historically, the common-law treated landowners as sovereign and 
provided them with various immunities to limit their liability for dangerous conditions on the 
land.   
A. The First Restatement “No Duty” Rule 
The First Restatement of Torts sets forth the traditional rule, or “no duty rule” of the open 
and obvious doctrine:  
A possessor of land is subject to liability for bodily harm caused to business 
visitors by a natural or artificial condition thereon if, but only if, he 
(a) knows, or by the exercise of reasonable care could discover, the condition 
                                                 
117 Id. 
118 See Lucinda S. Ingram, Missouri Retreats from the Known or Obvious Danger Rule in Premises Liability, 54 
MO. L. REV. 241, 248 (1989). 
119 See Ann K. Dittmeier, Premises Liability: The Disappearance of the Open and Obvious Doctrine, 64 MO. L. 
REV. 1021, 1025 (1999). 
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which, if known to him, he should realize as involving an unreasonable risk to 
them, and 
(b) has no reason to believe they will discover the condition or realize the risk 
involved therein, and 
(c) invites or permits them to remain upon the land without exercising reasonable 
care (i) to make the condition reasonably safe, or (ii) to give a warning adequate 
to enable them to avoid the harm.120 
 Thus, the landowner had no duty to protect invitees from dangerous conditions of which 
the invitee was aware, or which were so obvious that it is reasonable for the landowner to expect 
that the invitee would discover the danger and take reasonable care for his own safety.121  The 
First Restatement framed this as an objective test focusing on the landowner’s expectation, rather 
than the subjective test of whether the invitee’s conduct was justified.122 
 Courts have adopted various rationales in support of the “no duty” rule of the open and 
obvious doctrine.  The rationale most frequently applied is the concept that the landowners 
liability rests upon his superior knowledge as the condition of his land, and if the invitee 
possesses the same knowledge, the invitee is in a better position to protect himself than the 
landowner, and the invitee should exercise reasonable care for his safety.123  A second rationale 
used to support the “no duty” rule is that if a condition is open and obvious and an invitee knows 
or should know of the condition, the occupier is relieved of liability because it is not foreseeable 
that the visitor will not recognize or anticipate the danger presented by the condition, and 
therefore it is not “unreasonably dangerous.”124  This is so because the likelihood of injury is low 
                                                 
120 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 343 (1965). 
121 See Page Keeton, Personal Injuries Resulting from Open and Obvious Conditions, 100 U. PA. L. REV. 629, 642 
(1952). 
122 See Dittmeier, supra note 53, at 1026. 
123 See id. (citing Keeton, supra). 
124 See id. 
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in that people are likely to discover the danger and protect themselves against it.125 
Another approach used when holding that a possessor has no duty to protect an invitee 
from open and obvious conditions, defines the duty to keep the premises safe for invitees 
“applies only to defects or conditions which are in the nature of hidden dangers, traps, snares, 
pitfalls, and the like,” of which the invitee is not aware, and is not likely to observe or discover 
while exercising ordinary care.126  Here, the invitee “assumes all normal, obvious, or ordinary 
risks attendant to the use of the premises, relieving the possessor of any duty to reconstruct or 
alter them so as to obviate known or obvious dangers.”127 
2. The Second Restatement Approach 
 The rationale behind the original Restatement’s “no-duty” rule, is that the “duty to keep 
premises safe for invitees applies only to defects or conditions which are not known to the 
invitee, and would not be observed or discovered by him in the exercise of ordinary care, that the 
invitee assumes all normal, obvious, or ordinary risks attendant to the use of the premises,” 
thereby relieving the possessor of any duty to remove the known or obvious risks. 128  Many 
jurisdictions have moved away from this “no-duty” approach to known and obvious dangers in 
favor of a more lenient rule as adopted by the Restatement 2d.   
Restatement of Torts 2d, § 343 provides: 
A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm caused to his invitees 
by a condition on the land if, but only if, he 
(a) knows or by the exercise of reasonable care would discover the condition, and 
should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to such invitees, and  
(b) should expect that they will not discover or realize the danger, or will fail to 
                                                 
125 See id. 
126 62 AM. JUR. 2D Premises § 148 (citing Simoneaux v. Copolymer Rubber & Chemical Corp. 189 So.2d 745 (La. 
App.). 
127 Id.  
128 See id. 
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protect themselves against it, and 
(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to protect them against the danger.129 
Under the Restatement 2d, “obvious” means that both the condition and the risk are 
apparent to and would be recognized by a reasonable man, in the position of the visitor, 
exercising ordinary perception, intelligence, and judgment.130  The word “known” denotes not 
only knowledge of the existence of the condition or activity itself, but also appreciation of the 
danger it involves.131   
In Comment a in the Reporter’s Notes of section 343 the author instructs that section 343 
should be read together with section 343A.  What constitutes an unreasonable risk under the 
Restatement 2d may vary according to the nature of the defect and the circumstances giving rise 
to the injury.132  The Restatement suggests that many different factors should come into play and 
the inquiry under the Restatement is whether the possessor would foresee those circumstances.133  
For example, what constitutes reasonable care on the part of possessors of a premises such as a 
hospital, may be different than that of a possessor of premises such as an office building, because 
invitees on the premises of hospital are likely to have physical injuries or handicaps which makes 
them less capable as an “ordinarily reasonable man” to look out for themselves and protect 
themselves from dangerous conditions. 
Section 343A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides: 
(1)  A possessor of land is not liable to his invitees for physical harm caused to 
them by any activity or condition on the land whose danger is known or obvious 
to them, unless the possessor should anticipate the harm despite such knowledge 
or obviousness. 
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(2)  In determining whether the possessor should anticipate harm from a known 
and obvious danger, the fact that the invitee is entitled to make use of public land, 
or of the facilities of a public utility, is a factor of importance indicating that harm 
should be anticipated.134 
Comments e and f to § 343A(1) deal with the traditional rule and the newly formulated 
qualification respectively.135  Comment e provides that ordinarily, an invitee who enters land is 
“entitled to nothing more than knowledge of the conditions and dangers” he will encounter on 
the land.136  If he knows about the conditions of the land, or the activities that are carried on the 
land, and the dangers associated with either, then he is free to choose “whether the advantage to 
be gained is sufficient to justify him in incurring the risk by entering or remaining on the 
land.”137  Therefore, a possessor’s reasonable care does not require precautions or warning 
against known dangers, or dangers “so obvious to him that he may be expected to discover 
them.138 
Comment f provides that there are situations in which the possessor should anticipate that 
the condition will cause harm despite an invitee’s knowledge.139  In these cases, the possessor 
still owes a duty of reasonable care to the invitee, which may require him to warn the invitee, or 
take other precautions to safeguard the invitee from the harm presented by the condition.140  An 
example of this is where the dangers are such that “the possessor has reason to expect that the 
invitee’s attention may be distracted, so that he will not discover what is obvious, or he will 
forget what is discovered, or fail to protect himself against it.”141  Another example is “where the 
possessor has reason to expect that the invitee will proceed to encounter the known or obvious 
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danger because to a reasonable man in his position the advantages of doing so would outweigh 
the apparent risk.”142  In these cases, “the fact that the danger is known, or is obvious” does not 
conclusively determine the duty of the possessor, or whether he has acted reasonably under the 
circumstances.”143  It is, however, “important in determining whether the invitee is to be charged 
with contributory negligence, or assumption of risk.”144 
C. Michigan’s Open and Obvious Doctrine:  Lugo v. Ameritech Corp., Inc. 
In Lugo v. Ameritech Corp. Inc.,145 the Michigan Supreme Court reinstated the traditional 
view of the open and obvious danger doctrine in premises liability cases.  In Lugo, the Plaintiff 
was walking through the defendant’s parking lot in order to pay her telephone bill, when she 
stepped in a pothole and fell resulting in injury.146  The plaintiff testified in her deposition that 
she did not see the pothole before the accident because she was concentrating on a truck that was 
moving through the parking lot at the time.  However, she also testified that nothing would have 
prevented her from seeing the pothole otherwise.  The circuit court granted the defendant’s 
motion for summary disposition on the basis that the pothole was an open and obvious danger, 
and thus the defendant did not have a duty to protect the plaintiff.147 
The Court of Appeals reversed the grant of summary disposition.148  The Court of 
Appeals found that the circuit court erred by concluding that the plaintiff’s legal duty to look 
where she was walking barred her claim.  The Court applied the principles of comparative 
negligence and stated that a plaintiff’s negligence can only reduce the amount of recovery; it 
cannot eliminate altogether the defendant’s liability.  The Court also found a genuine issue of 
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material fact regarding the open and obvious danger rule based on whether defendant should 
have expected that a pedestrian might be distracted by a moving vehicle, and might step into a 
pothole in order to avoid a vehicle.  The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals in a 4-3 
decision. 
 The majority declared the open and obvious doctrine as an integral part of the definition 
of the duty an invitor owes to his invitees.149  The Court adopted the reasoning set forth in 
Bertrand v. Alan Ford: 
When §§ 343 and 343A [of the Restatement of Torts, 2d] are read together, the 
rule generated is that if the particular activity or condition creates a risk of harm 
only because the invitee does not discover the condition or realize its danger, then 
the open and obvious doctrine will cut off liability if the invitee should have 
discovered the condition and realized its danger.  On the other hand, if the risk of 
harm remains unreasonable, despite its obviousness or despite knowledge of it by 
the invitee, then the circumstances may be such that the invitor is required to 
undertake reasonable precautions.150 
That duty, in general, requires the premises possessor to “exercise reasonable care to 
protect an invitee from an unreasonable risk of harm caused by a dangerous condition on the 
land.”151  However, “where the dangers are so known to the invitee or are so obvious that the 
invitee might reasonably be expected to discover them, an invitor owes no duty to protect or 
warn the invitee unless he should anticipate the harm despite knowledge of it on behalf of the 
invitee.”152  The Court adopted the general rule that “a premises possessor is not required to 
protect an invitee from open and obvious dangers, but, if special aspects of a condition make 
even an open and obvious risk unreasonably dangerous, the premises possessor has a duty to 
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undertake reasonable precautions to protect invitees from that risk.”153 
Court provided two illustrations of open and obvious conditions which possessed “special 
aspects” that served to make the conditions unreasonably dangerous: (1) “a commercial building 
with only one exit for the general public where the floor is covered with standing water,” and (2) 
“a thirty foot deep pit in the middle of a parking lot.”154  In the first situation, a customer trying 
to leave the building would have to go through the water in order to do so.155  Thus, although the 
condition is open and obvious, the condition is effectively unavoidable.156  In the second 
situation, although the pit in the parking lot “might be open and obvious, and one would be 
capable of avoiding the danger, the situation would still present such a substantial risk of death 
or severe injury to one who fell in the pit that it would be unreasonably dangerous to maintain 
the condition, at least absent reasonable warnings or other remedial measures being taken.”157   
The Court concluded “only those special aspects that give rise to a uniquely high 
likelihood of harm or severity of harm if the risk is not avoided will serve to remove that 
condition from the open and obvious danger doctrine.”158  Applying this rule to the facts, the 
Court concluded that plaintiff’s claim was barred by the open and obvious danger doctrine 
because the condition was a common pothole in a parking lot and the plaintiff failed to show 
what special aspects of the pothole made it unreasonably dangerous.159  The plaintiff argued that 
moving vehicles in the parking lot distracted her and prevented her from noticing the condition, 
however, the court emphasized “there is certainly nothing “unusual” about vehicles being driven 
in the parking lot, and, accordingly, this is not a factor that removes this case from the open and 
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obvious danger doctrine.”160 
Thus, the rule adopted by the Michigan Supreme Court in Lugo can be summarized as 
follows:  A possessor of land owes its invitees a duty to “exercise reasonable care to protect the 
invitee from an unreasonable risk of harm caused by a dangerous condition on the land.”161  This 
duty does not extend to open and obvious dangers unless special aspects of the condition create 
an unreasonable risk of harm.162 
In his concurrence, Justice Cavanaugh argues that sections 343 and 343A of the 
Restatement should not be read so as to create a duty, rather they should be read together so as to 
set forth the standard of care.163  Furthermore, special aspects of a particular condition may be 
relevant in determining whether the landowner is liable, but the court should make this 
determination in the context of the Restatement test.164  He states:  
[W]hile “special aspects” may be considered in determining whether liability 
should be suspended, the existence or absence of special aspects in a particular 
case will not necessarily be outcome determinative.  Instead, pursuant to the 
Restatement, courts must focus on whether an unreasonable danger is presented, 
whether harm should be anticipated, and whether the duty of care has been 
breached.165 
 In her concurrence, Justice Weaver rejects the “severe harm” standard that the majority 
adopted.166  Justice Weaver scolds the majority for adopting hypothetical standards that are 
unlikely.167  She stated, “When launching new legal principles from a factual vacuum, it would 
be more helpful to apply this new severe-harm standard to an actual case before the Court”.168   
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D. Courts Applying Lugo 
1. Joyce v. Rubin 
In Joyce v. Rubin, 169 the Court of Appeals clarified that the open and obvious doctrine 
applies to claims brought under a failure to maintain theory as well as claims premised upon a 
failure to warn theory.  In Joyce, the plaintiff invitee sued defendant homeowners for injuries 
suffered when she slipped and fell on the snow walkway.  The Court of Appeals first 
acknowledge that the open and obvious doctrine not only eliminates the possessor’s duty to 
warn, it also eliminates the possessor’s duty to maintain premises and does not require removal 
of open and obvious dangers.170  The Court went on to determine whether the condition of the 
walkway was open and obvious.171 
The Court determined that the plaintiff, and “an average user of ordinary intelligence 
would have been able to discover” the condition of the sidewalk.172  The Court further noted that 
the plaintiff had testified that it had snowed that day, that she slipped on the snow that had not 
yet melted, and that the sidewalk was slippery.173  The plaintiff also testified that she had told the 
defendant that it was slippery and that she had slipped twice while walking on the sidewalk 
before she ultimately fell.174  Based on these facts, the court found that “an average person with 
ordinary intelligence” would have discovered the condition and realized the risk of slipping on it; 
therefore, the condition was open and obvious.175 
After finding that the condition was open and obvious, the Court then looked at whether 
there were special aspects of the condition that made it unreasonably dangerous thereby 
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imposing liability upon the defendant.  The plaintiff argued that the condition was “effectively 
unavoidable” because it was the only way she could enter the house.176  She testified that she had 
told the defendant about the slippery conditions and asked her if she could enter through the 
garage or use the rug for traction but the defendant refused her requests.177  However, the court 
determined that this was not enough evidence to demonstrate a “uniquely high likelihood of 
harm” or that it was an “unavoidable risk.”178  The court felt that the plaintiff could have simply 
removed her personal items another day or advised the defendant that if she would not permit her 
to use the garage door, she would have to come back another day.  The court said, “unlike the 
example in Lugo, Joyce was not effectively trapped inside a building so that she must encounter 
the open and obvious condition in order to get out.”179  Furthermore, the court found that the 
light snow on the sidewalk was a common condition that was unremarkable and was not the kind 
of “uniquely dangerous” condition, which warrants removal from the open and obvious 
doctrine.180 
2. Corey v. Davenport College of Business 
In Corey v. Davenport College of Business, (On Remand),181 rejected the notion that 
snowy and icy conditions are an exception to the open and obvious doctrine.  The court 
reconciled the former decision, Quinlivan v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., Inc.,182 with the 
more recent decision in Joyce.183  In Quinlivan, the Court discussed an invitor’s responsibility 
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regarding snow and ice hazards that were visible to invitees.184  The Court quoted the following 
statement from Quinlivan: 
[W]e reject the prominently cited notion that ice and snow hazards are obvious to 
all and therefore may not give rise to liability.  While the invitor is not an absolute 
insurer of the safety of the invitee, the invitor has a duty to exercise reasonable 
care to diminish the hazards of ice and snow accumulation….  As such duty 
pertains to ice and snow accumulations, it will require that reasonable measures 
be taken within a reasonable time after an accumulation of ice and snow to 
diminish the hazards of injury to the invitee.185 
The court reconciled these decisions by holding that “the analysis in Quinlivan will now 
be part of whether there are special aspects of the condition that make it unreasonably dangerous 
even if the condition is open and obvious.186 
The court held that an icy stairway leading into a dormitory was an open and obvious 
condition that possessed no “special aspects” to remove the condition from the open and obvious 
doctrine.  The plaintiff in Corey testified that he saw the condition of the steps, that there was 
another entrance to the building nearby, but he nonetheless attempted to use the steps.187  The 
court determined that “[a]lthough the steps likely had ‘some potential for severe harm,’ we have 
no doubt that these circumstances are not the type of special aspects that Lugo contemplated.”188  
The court recognized that “the stairway on which plaintiff fell consisted of three steps and was 
elevated only a couple of feet.”189  The court, determined that “[f]alling several feet to the ground 
is not the same as falling an extended distance such as into a thirty-foot-deep pit” and does not 
represent “such a substantial risk of death or severe injury that it would be unreasonably 
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dangerous to maintain the condition.”190 
3. Perkoviq v. Delcor Homes-Lake Shore Pointe 
In its most recent open and obvious decision, Perkoviq v. Delcor Homes-Lake Shore 
Pointe,191 our Supreme Court determined that there were no “special aspects” of snow and ice on 
a sloped rooftop to remove the condition from the open and obvious doctrine.  In Perkoviq, the 
plaintiff sued the defendant owner/general contractor when he slipped on ice or frost on a house 
roof and fell approximately 20 feet.  The Supreme Court found that the condition of the roof was 
open and obvious, and there were no special aspects of the condition that would serve to remove 
the condition from the open and obvious doctrine.192  In this case, the owner was also the general 
contractor who hired plaintiff to perform painting services on the project.  The roof was in an 
unfinished state, and there were several plywood boards attached to support workers.  As 
plaintiff was attempting to attach another board, he slipped on frost on the plywood.  The 
Supreme Court held that the plaintiff failed to present “evidence that the condition of the roof 
was unreasonably dangerous for purposes of premises liability.”193  The mere presence of ice, 
snow, or frost on a sloped rooftop generally does not create an unreasonably dangerous 
condition.”194  Thus, under Perkoviq, even a fall of an extended distance does not necessarily 
constitute an “unreasonably dangerous condition” because even though the risk of falling and the 
severe injury that is likely, there were no “special aspects” of the roof that served to remove it 
from the open and obvious doctrine.195 
E. So, What is Reasonable? 
                                                 
190 Id. quoting Lugo, supra at 518 
191 466 Mich. 11, 20, 643 N.W.2d 212, 216 (2002). 
192 Id. 
193 Id. 
194 Id. 
195 Id. 
 35 
Under Lugo, the question of whether a condition is open and obvious is whether “an 
average user with ordinary intelligence would have been able to discover the danger and the risk 
presented upon casual inspection.”196  Thus, the circumstances surrounding the particular injury 
are not necessarily relevant.  Even though, the Second Restatement suggests that many different 
factors should come into play and the inquiry under the Restatement is whether the possessor 
would foresee those circumstances197 it appears that the majority is only willing to look at the 
actual physical condition, and the surrounding circumstances are irrelevant.  For example, what 
constitutes reasonable care on the part of possessors of a premises such as a hospital, may be 
different than that of a possessor of premises such as an office building, because invitees on the 
premises of hospital are likely to have physical injuries or handicaps which makes them less 
capable as an “ordinarily reasonable man” to look out for themselves and protect themselves 
from dangerous conditions. 
Once the court determines that a condition is "open and obvious”, it is very difficult to 
prove that it is unreasonably dangerous as demonstrated by the decisions cited above.  Courts 
have relied on the examples cited in Lugo as requiring the condition to be “unavoidable” to 
constitute an “unreasonably dangerous” condition.  Courts have taken this concept so far as to 
conclude that if the visitor could avoid the condition by coming back at a later time or day, the 
condition is avoidable, and therefore not unreasonably dangerous.  Also, when the courts have 
addressed the “severity of harm” it appears that a simple trip-and-fall, or slip-and-fall at ground 
level will not be sufficient.198 
The impact of Lugo is not apparent until one examines the amount of cases that are 
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summarily dismissed under the open and obvious doctrine.  Since the Supreme Court decided 
Lugo in July 2001, the Court of Appeals has reviewed approximately 73 motions for summary 
disposition or directed verdicts that raised the “open and obvious danger doctrine.”199  The 
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defendant prevailed in 66 of these decisions.  Of the remaining six decisions, in which summary 
disposition was denied, only two were because the condition was not open and obvious,200 and in 
four decisions, the court determined that although the condition was open and obvious, there was 
a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the danger was unreasonable despite its openness 
and obviousness.201  In the remaining 66 decisions, the Court of Appeals upheld the motion for 
summary disposition or directed verdict on behalf of the defendant on the basis that the 
defendant owed the plaintiff no duty because the condition was open and obvious and plaintiff 
failed to present evidence of “special aspects” which would give rise to a duty of the possessor to 
warn or make safe the dangerous condition despite its openness and obviousness.   
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Arguably, under the new rule, premises possessors now have little incentive to reduce the 
hazards of snow and ice once required under Quinlivan.  This is so because the more open and 
obvious the ice and snow are, the less likely the plaintiff will be able to recover.  Few buildings 
only have one exit, and the court has indicated that if there is a dangerous condition on the 
property when you are trying to enter, you should wait and come back when the condition is 
gone or the landowner has taken steps to correct the condition. 
The Court has given little regard to the fact that juries have properly applied negligence 
principles in all other areas of tort law.  Furthermore, modern jurors are likely to be landowners 
themselves and as such, are unlikely to impose standards upon another that they would not be 
willing to comply.  In a recent study, using a sample of 75 of the nation’s largest counties in 
1992, the mean plaintiff win rate for all jury cases was 49%, for premises liability cases, 43%.202  
The study found that typical jury awards are “modest” with a median jury verdict, including 
punitive damages at $52,000.203  However, because of some very high awards, the arithmetic 
mean of those awards was $455,000.  In fact, 85% of all awards were less than the mean and 
only 8% of awards exceeded 1 million.204  Additionally, the study demonstrated that judge and 
jury agreed on liability 78% of the time, with disagreement split evenly between plaintiffs and 
defendants.205 
The rationales for imposing a reasonableness standard outweigh the arguments against it.  
First, the landowner is in the best position to make the premises safe and should incur the lower 
cost of removing or preventing unsafe conditions rather than imposing the high cost on the 
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individual who was not “paying attention to where they were walking.”  Under the Lugo rule, the 
more open and obvious a condition is, the more likely the landowner will prevail; this is 
especially true with snow and ice.  The costs to the public by not imposing such a duty upon the 
landowner such as increases in health care costs, costs to employers and the costs to those 
individuals who are injured as a result of the landowner’s negligence.  Storeowners and business 
proprietors are in a better position to spread the costs than the injured plaintiff is and imposing 
liability upon them, is a significant incentive to conduct their affairs in a reasonable manner.   
The classifications of the entrant and the open and obvious nature of the condition should 
be factors in determining the reasonableness of the landowner’s activity.  The inquiry should be 
whether the landowner’s conduct was reasonable under the circumstances.  Therefore, the court 
should consider all of the circumstances instead of limiting its focus on the specific condition, 
such as the foreseeability that the plaintiff would have been engaging in an activity that may 
have prevented her from noticing the condition.  Alternatively, that the plaintiff may be 
handicapped or elderly and encountering the condition is unreasonably dangerous to them.  The 
court should adopt the Restatement Second approach where the surrounding circumstances that 
caused the plaintiff not to notice or avoid the condition should be taken into consideration in 
determining whether summary disposition is appropriate rather than “special aspects” of the 
condition itself. 
V. Conclusion 
 Returning to the scenario presented at the beginning of this paper, the court found the 
condition was open and obvious and granted summary judgment on behalf of the defendant.206  
Even though Plaintiff was unable to see the condition of the floor because of her blindness, the 
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court found that the condition possessed no special aspects that would remove it from the open 
and obvious doctrine.207  Plaintiff did not show that the defendant should have expected that she 
would not have discovered the unsafe condition or fail to protect herself from it.208 
The fact that Michigan is part of a small, conservative minority of jurisdictions with 
respect to tort common-law is of no consequence to the Michigan Supreme Court.  By reviving 
the harsh, technical rules that the majority of other jurisdictions have rejected, Michigan’s 
Supreme Court is sending the message that it will not tolerate suits for personal injury, 
irrespective of the facts of the individual cases.  These rules allow defendants in premises 
liabilities to avoid reaching the jury.  The Michigan Supreme Court has demonstrated its mistrust 
of the jury and its distaste for plaintiffs in premises liability cases by adopting a narrow 
interpretation of what constitutes an invitee, and redefining that duty owed by invitors to exempt 
conditions that are open and obvious, no matter the likelihood of injury. 
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